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CIVIL APPEAL: ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY 
 
Summary  
  
The Court determined two issues: (1) whether an appeals officer’s conclusory order in a 
workers’ compensation matter failed to meet the statutory requirements of NRS 233B.125; and 
(2) whether the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion apply to require dismissal of a fourth 
request to reopen an industrial injury claim under NRS 616C.390. 
  
Disposition  
  
A written order from an administrative proceeding must include findings of fact and 
conclusions of law under NRS 233B.125.  Without such, it is impossible for the court to 
determine if there has been a change of circumstances warranting a reopening of the claim under 
NRS 616C.390.   
  
Factual and Procedural History  
  
In 2000, appellant Carlos Elizondo filed an industrial injury claim as a result of an 
abdominal injury while employed by respondent Hood Machine.  In 2001, the physician who 
conducted Elizondo’s permanent partial disability (PPD) examination gave him a zero-percent 
disability rating, and his claim was closed by respondent Employers Insurance Company of 
Nevada (EICON). 
 Elizondo sought to have his claim reopened three times based upon new opinions from 
physicians; each time the claim was denied.  After his claim was again denied in 2007, Elizondo 
petitioned the district court for judicial review of the denial.  The district court denied his petition 
because substantial evidence supported the appeals officer’s determination.  Elizondo appealed 
the district court’s order, and Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. 
 In 2011, Elizondo filed a fourth request to reopen his claim and was again denied.  He 
administratively appealed the denial of his request, and the hearing officer affirmed the denial 
because the medical report Elizondo provided did not meet the requirements of NRS 616C.390, 
which states that the standard required for admissibility of an expert opinion regarding causation 
is a reasonable degree of medical probability.  Elizondo then administratively appealed the 
decision, and the appeal’s officer denied it without providing any factual or legal explanation.   
 Elizondo then filed a petition for judicial review to the district court arguing that the 
appeals officer’s order failed to meet the statutory requirements of NRS 233B.125 and that it was 
not supported by substantial evidence.  EICON contended that Elizondo was precluded from 
reopening his claim under the doctrine of res judicata.  The district court denied Elizondo’s 
petition because he did not state a new cause of action that could withstand the application of res 
judicata.  Elizondo appealed.      
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 By Jennifer Cutshall. 
Discussion  
  
The appeals officer’s order failed to meet the statutory requirements of NRS 233B.125 
 
Elizondo argued that the appeals officer’s order failed to meet the statutory requirements 
of NRS 233B.1252 because the order summarily dismissed his claim and did not include any 
specific findings of fact or citation to the law.  He also argued that the order failed to support its 
final determination by applying the facts to the law.  The Nevada Supreme Court agreed. 
 NRS 233B.125 governs adverse written orders in administrative proceedings and requires 
that a final decision must include separately stated findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Here, 
the appeals officer’s order “made reference to and generally adopted EICON’s arguments as 
pleaded in its motion to dismiss” and contained no factual findings.  Therefore, the order “fails to 
meet the statutory requirements of NRS 233B.125 and is thus procedurally deficient.”  Because 
the order is deficient, it “precludes adequate review on appeal and prevents this Court from 
determining whether Elizondo’s substantial rights were violated.” 
 
The appeals officer erred in applying the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion to bar 
Elizondo’s request to reopen his workers’ compensation claim pursuant to NRS 616C.390. 
 
 Elizondo argues that his statutory right under NRS 616C.3903 to request a reopening of 
his claim cannot be defeated by application of res judicata because such an application was 
rejected in Jerry’s Nugget v. Keith4.  In Jerry’s Nugget, the court determined that the doctrines of 
issue and claim preclusion cannot be used as “defenses to reopening a [worker’s compensation] 
claim if an employee can show a change in circumstance.”  Thus, the proper analysis is whether 
there has been a change of circumstances.  Because the district court failed to provide any 
findings of fact or conclusions of law, “this Court cannot properly review the appeals officer’s 
determination that there was no change of circumstances warranting reopening under NRS 
616C.390.”   
 
Conclusion 
 
A written order from an administrative proceeding must include findings of fact and 
conclusions of law under NRS 233B.125, and the order here contained neither.  Because no 
findings of fact or conclusions of law are available in this case, it is impossible for the court to 
determine if there have been changes of circumstance warranting a reopening of the claim under 
NRS 616C.390.  The court remanded the case to the district court so that “findings of fact and 
conclusions of law may be properly made.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.125 (2013). 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. § 616C.390 (2013). 
4 111 Nev. 49, 888 P.2d 921 (1995).	  
